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Abstract— In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied.
Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible
action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear
equality constraint that is coupled through decisions of the
other players. We consider that each player has his own private
constraint and it has not to be shared with the other players.
This general case also embodies the one with shared constraints
between players and it can be also simply extended to the case
with inequality constraints. Since the players don’t have access
to other players’ actions, they need to exchange estimates of
others’ actions and a local copy of the Lagrangian multiplier
with their neighbors over a connected communication graph.
We develop a relatively fast algorithm by reformulating the
conservative GNE problem within the framework of inexact-
ADMM. The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed under
a few mild assumptions on cost functions. Finally, the algorithm
is simulated for a wireless ad-hoc network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) has recently drawn many attentions due to its applica-
bility in various networked games with coupling constraints
such as power grids [1], optical networks [2] and wireless
communication networks [3].
In such games, each player aims to minimize his cost
function by taking a proper action in response to other
players. Each player’s feasible decision set is dependent on
other players’ actions. We are interested in seeking a GNE,
which is a point that no player can unilaterally deviate his
local action to minimize his cost function.
Due to similarities between this problem and distributed
consensus optimization problems (DCOPs), we aim to em-
ploy an efficient, robust and fast optimization technique
referred to as the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) to find a GNE of a multi-player game. The key
differences between DCOP and GNE problem is that in a
DCOP each agent desires to minimize a global objective by
controlling a full vector optimization variable. However, in a
GNE problem, we have a set of local optimization problems
assigned to each player who controls only his action (which
is an element of a full vector). This leads to have a sub-
optimization problem associated to each player such that
each of them is dependent on the other players’ actions.
Related Works. Our work is related to the literature on
(generalized) Nash games such as [4]–[7] and DCOPs such
as [8], [9]. (G)NE seeking in distributed networked games
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has recently attracted an increased interest due to many real-
world applications. To name only a few, [10], [11].
In [10], the problem of finding GNE is studied in a
networked game. A gradient-based algorithm is designed
over a complete communication graph. Convergence proof
is analyzed in the presence of delay and dynamic change.
Similar to [1], the problem of seeking a GNE is discussed
in [12] for the games that players have access to all players’
actions on which their cost depends on. Thus, they exchange
only local multipliers not the estimates of others’ actions.
A Nash game with a coupled constraint is considered in
[13]. A variational inequality related approach is used to
compute a GNE of the game. The authors in [14] solve a
quadratic GNE problem with linear shared coupled constraint
using Lemkes method.
Recently, there has been a widespread research on GNE
seeking in aggregative games [1], [13], [14]. Quadratic ag-
gregative games with affine and convex coupling constraints
are studied in [15], [16]. A coordination scheme belonging
to a class of asymmetric projection algorithm is presented
in [15] and its convergence to a GNE is then discussed.
A model-free dynamic control law, based on monotone
operator, is proposed in [16] to ensure the global convergence
to a GNE.
ADMM algorithms, which are in the scope of this paper,
have been developed in 70’s to find an efficient way to
obtain an optimal point of distributed optimization problems
(DOPs) [17], [18]. After the re-introduction of this method
in [18], ADMM has become widely used to locate optimal
points of DOPs as a robust and fast technique [19], [20].
An inexact-ADMM algorithm is proposed in [8] for DCOPs
with an affine equality constraint. In [21], we develop a
methodology to relate a distributed NE problem with no
coupled constraint to a DCOP using augmentation technique.
It is shown that an NE problem can be treated as a set of sub-
optimization problems with an augmented equality constraint
for the estimates of the players.
Contributions. Motivated by ADMM methods designed
for DCOPs, we develop a relatively fast algorithm for GNE
problems within the framework of inexact-ADMM. Players
are only aware of their own cost functions (which are not
in the form of aggregative but general game), problem data
(which is related to a private coupled equality constraint for
each player) and action set of all players (they are not aware
of the others’ actions). We reformulate the conservative GNE
problem into the corresponding Lagrange dual problem and
then we augment it using local estimates of players’ actions
as well as local copies of Lagrange multipliers. We derive a
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set of GNE conditions using the associated KKT conditions
and finally we develop an inexact-ADMM algorithm based
on the augmented Lagrange function which is related to each
player. The convergence proof of the algorithm to a GNE of
the game is then provided under a few mild assumptions on
players’ cost functions.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem statement
and assumptions are provided in Section II. In Section III,
an inexact-ADMM-like algorithm is derived. Convergence of
the proposed algorithm to a GNE of the game is discussed
in Section IV. Simulation results are illustrated in Section V
and concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider V = {1, . . . , N} as a set of N players that seek
a GNE of a networked game with individual linear coupled
constraints. The game is denoted by G and defined as follows:
• Ωi ⊂ R: Action set of player i, ∀i ∈ V ,
• Ω =
∏
i∈V Ωi ⊂ RN : Action set of all players,
• Ji : Ω→ R: Cost function of player i, ∀i ∈ V .
The game G(V,Ωi, Ji) is defined over the set of players,
V , the action set of player i ∈ V , Ωi and the cost function
of player i ∈ V , Ji.
The players’ actions are denoted as follows:
• x = (xi, x−i) ∈ Ω: All players actions,
• xi ∈ Ωi: Player i’s action, ∀i ∈ V ,
• x−i∈Ω−i :=
∏
j∈V \{i}Ωj :All players’ actions except i.
The local data of player i is given as Ai := [Aii, [A
i
j ]j 6=i] ∈
Rm×N with Aii ∈ Rm, and bi ∈ Rm. Note that in this work,
we are interested in a more general case in which each player
has access only to his own private constraint which has not
to be shared with the other players.
Assumption 1. 1There exists a positive semi-definite matrix
Bi ∈ Rm×m for all i ∈ V such that,
Aii ∈ ker(Bi − Im), Aij ∈ ker(Bi) j 6= i. (1)
Player i’s feasible strategy set is then denoted by
Xi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Ωi|Aix = bi}2.
The game is played such that for a given x−i ∈ Ω−i,
each player i ∈ V aims to minimize his own cost function
selfishly w.r.t. xi subject to a private equality constraint.{
minimize
xi
Ji(xi, x−i)
s.t. xi ∈ Xi(x−i).
(2)
Each optimization problem is run by a particular player i at
the same time with other players. Note that (2) can simply
accommodate inequality constraints Aix ≥ bi by adding a
slack variable y ≥ 0 and rewrite the inequality constraint as
Aix−y = bi. Note that the constraint y ≥ 0 can be enforced
by a convex indicator function.
1Derivation of the algorithm is not dependent on Assumption 1. Simula-
tions for various cases for matrix Ai, even the ones that do not satisfy this
assumption, verify that the algorithm works even without considering this
assumption. However, this assumption is used at the convergence proof.
2This case contains games with shared constraints for which Ax = b for
all i ∈ V and m ≥ N
An NE of a game is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Consider an N -player game G(V,Ωi, Ji), each
player i minimizing the cost function Ji : Ω → R. A vector
x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) ∈ Ω is called a GNE of this game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi(x∗−i), ∀i ∈ V. (3)
An NE lies at the intersection of all solutions of the set
(2). The key challenges are two-fold. First, each optimization
problem in (2) is dependent on the solution of the other
simultaneous problems; second, the solutions are coupled
through a linear constraint.
Since this game is distributed, no player is aware of the
actions, cost functions and constraints of the other players.
Thus, each player i maintains an estimate of the other
players’ actions. We define a few notations, in the following,
for players’ estimates.
• xi = (xii, x
i
−i) ∈ Ω: Player i’s estimate of all players
actions,
• xii ∈ Ωi: Player i’s estimate of his own action which is
indeed his action, i.e., xii = xi ∀i ∈ V ,
• xi−i ∈ Ω−i :=
∏
j∈V \{i}Ωj : Player i’s estimate of all
other players’ actions except his action,
• x = [x1T , . . . , xNT ]T ∈ ΩN : Augmented vector of
estimates of all players’ actions
Note that all players’ actions can be interchangeably repre-
sented as x = (xii)i∈V .
We assume that the cost function Ji, the action set Ω and
the problem data Ai, bi are the only information available to
player i. Thus, the players exchange their estimates in order
to update their actions. An undirected communication graph
GC(V,E) is defined with E ⊆ V × V denoting the set of
communication links between the players. (i, j) ∈ E if and
only if players i and j exchange estimates. In the following,
we have a few definitions for GC :
• Ni := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E}: Set of neighbors of i in GC ,
• H := [hij ]i,j∈V : Adjacency matrix associated with GC
where hij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and hij = 0 otherwise,
• D := diag{|N1|, . . . , |NN |}: Degree matrix associated
with GC .
The following assumption is used for GC .
Assumption 2. GC is a connected graph.
We aim to link game (2) to a set of optimization problems
whose solutions can be based on the ADMM. Game (2) is
equivalently represented as the following problem for i ∈ V .{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi, x−i)
s.t. Aix = bi.
(4)
Let λ ∈ Rm be the joint Lagrange dual variable associated
with the linear constraint Aix = bi ∀i ∈ V . The Lagrange
dual problem of (4) can be written as follows for i ∈ V .{
max
λ∈Rm
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi, x−i) + λT (Aix− bi). (5)
Note that we are interested in computing a variational
GNE of the game since we assumed a common Lagrange
multiplier λ for each player in (5). Using the estimates
of the actions xi and the local copies of the Lagrange
dual variables λi for i ∈ V , we reformulate (5) so that
the objective function is separable (the estimates are also
interpreted as the local copies of x). Moreover, the slack
variables tls|{l∈V, s∈Nl} ∈ Ω and pls|{l∈V, s∈Nl} ∈ Rm are
employed to enforce that the local copies are equivalent.
max
λi∈Rm,pls
min
xii∈Ωi,tls
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i)+IΩi(xii)+λi
T
(Aixi−bi)
s.t. xl = tls ∀l ∈ V, ∀s ∈ Nl,
xs = tls ∀l ∈ V, ∀s ∈ Nl,
λl = pls ∀l ∈ V, ∀s ∈ Nl,
λs = pls ∀l ∈ V, ∀s ∈ Nl,
(6)
where IΩi(xii) :=
{
0 if xii ∈ Ωi
∞ otherwise is an indicator function
of the feasibility constraint xii ∈ Ωi. Note that the solution
of (6) is equivalent to that of (5), i.e., xii = xi, λ
i = λ
for all i ∈ V . The ADMM is then employed to solve (6)
in a distributed manner. A characterization of the NE for
game (2) could be obtained by finding the KKT conditions on
(6). Let {uls, vls, wls, zls}l∈V,s∈Nl with uls, vls ∈ RN and
wls, zls ∈ Rm be the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the four constraints in (6), respectively. The corresponding
Lagrange function for player i, ∀i ∈ V is as follows:
Li
(
xii, {tls, uls, vls}, λi, {pls, wls, zls}
)
:= Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i) + IΩi(xii) + λi
T
(Aixi − bi)
+
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
uls
T
(xl − tls) + vlsT (xs − tls),
−
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
wls
T
(λl − pls) + zlsT (λs − pls). (7)
Let (xi∗, λi∗)i∈V and {uls∗, vls∗, wls∗, zls∗}l∈V, s∈Nl be a
pair of primal and dual optimal solution to (6). Let denote∑
j∈Ni u
ij + vji := U i and
∑
j∈Ni w
ij + zji := W i for
notational simplicity. The KKT conditions are summarized
as follows for i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni:
∇iJi(xi∗) + ∂IΩi(xii∗) + λi∗TAii + U ii ∗ = 0,
Aixi
∗ − bi −W i∗ = 0m,
xi
∗
= xj
∗
, λi
∗
= λj
∗
,
uij
∗
+ vij
∗
= 0N , wij
∗
+ zij
∗
= 0m,
(8)
where ∇iJi(·) is gradient of Ji w.r.t. xi and ∂iIΩi(·) is a
subgradient of IΩi at xi. By (8) and Assumption 2, x1∗ =
. . .=xN
∗
:=x∗ and λ1∗= . . .=λN ∗ :=λ∗. Then, the GNE
of (2), x∗, satisfies the following equations ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni:
∇iJi(x∗) + ∂IΩi(xi∗) + λ∗TAii + U ii ∗ = 0,
Aix∗ − bi −W i∗ = 0m,
uij
∗
+ vij
∗
= 0N , wij
∗
+ zij
∗
= 0m.
(9)
In the following, we state a few assumptions for the existence
of a GNE.
Assumption 3. For every i ∈ V ,
• Ωi ⊂ R is compact and convex
• Xi(x−i) is non-empty for every x−i
• Ji(xi, x−i) is C1 in xi, jointly continuous in x and
convex in xi, for every x−i.
The convexity of Ωi implies that the indicator function IΩi
is convex. This yields that there exists at least one bounded
subgradient ∂IΩi .
Assumption 4. Let F : ΩN → RN , F (x) := [∇iJi(xi)]i∈V
be the pseudo-gradient vector (game map) where x :=
[x1
T
, . . . , xN
T
]T ∈ ΩN . F is cocoercive ∀x ∈ ΩN and
y ∈ ΩN , i.e.,
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ σF ‖F (x)− F (y)‖2, (10)
where σF > 0.
III. DISTRIBUTED INEXACT-ADMM ALGORITHM
Our objective is to find an ADMM-like algorithm for
computing a GNE of G(V,Ωi, Ji) using only imperfect
information over the communication graph GC(V,E).
The algorithm is elaborated in the following steps:
1- Initialization Step: Each player i ∈ V maintains an
initial estimate for all players’ actions, xi(0) ∈ Ω and an
initial Lagrange multiplier, λi(0) ∈ Rm. The initial values
of uij(0), vij(0), wij(0) and zij(0) are all set to be zero for
all i ∈ V , j ∈ Ni.
2- Communication Step: At iteration T (k), each player
i ∈ V exchanges his previous estimate of the other players’
actions xi(k−1) and his dual Lagrange multiplier λi(k−1)
with his neighbors j ∈ Ni.
3- Action Update Step: At this moment all players update
their actions, estimates and Lagrange multiplier via the
ADMM. For each player i ∈ V , let the augmented Lagrange
function associated with (6) be as follows:
Lai
(
xii, {tls, uls, vls}, λi, {pls, wls, zls}
)
:= Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i) + IΩi(xii) + λi
T
(Aixi − bi)
+
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
uls
T
(xl − tls) + vlsT (xs − tls)
−
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
wls
T
(λl − pls) + zlsT (λs − pls)
+
c
2
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
(‖xl − tls‖2 + ‖xs − tls‖2)
− c
2
∑
l∈V
∑
s∈Nl
(‖λl − pls‖2 + ‖λs − pls‖2), (11)
where c > 0 is a scalar coefficient. Consider the ADMM
algorithm associated with (6) based on (11):
The dual Lagrange multipliers uij , vij , wij , zij update
rules ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni are as follows:
uij(k) = uij(k − 1) + c
2
(
xi(k − 1)− xj(k − 1)), (12)
vij(k) = vij(k − 1) + c
2
(
xj(k − 1)− xi(k − 1)), (13)
wij(k) = wij(k − 1) + c
2
(
λi(k − 1)− λj(k − 1)), (14)
zij(k) = zij(k − 1) + c
2
(
λj(k − 1)− λi(k − 1)). (15)
The update rule for the slack variable tij ∈ RN , ∀i ∈
V, j ∈ Ni, which is based on (11), is as follows:
tij(k) = arg min
tij
Lai
(
xi(k − 1), {tls, uls(k), vls(k)},
λi(k − 1), {pls(k − 1), wls(k), zls(k)}
)
= arg min
tij
{
− (uij(k) + vij(k))T tij
+
c
2
(‖xi(k − 1)− tij‖2 + ‖xj(k − 1)− tij‖2)
}
=
1
2c
(uij(k) + vij(k)) +
1
2
(xi(k − 1) + xj(k − 1)).(16)
The initial conditions uij(0) = vij(0) = 0N ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni
along with (12) and (13) suggest that uij(k) + vij(k) = 0N
∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni, k > 0. Then, (16) yields,
tij(k) =
xi(k − 1) + xj(k − 1)
2
. (17)
Similarly the update rule for pij ∈ Rm ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni is
represented as the following:
pij(k) =
λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
2
. (18)
The local estimate update for all i ∈ V is a min-max
optimization problem based on (11).
xii(k)=arg min
xii∈R
max
λi∈Rm
Lai
(
xii, {tls(k), uls(k), vls(k)}, λi,
{pls(k), wls(k), zls(k)}
)
= arg min
xii
max
λi
{
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k − 1)) + IΩi(xii)
−λiT bi + λiTAiixii + λi
T
Ai−ix
i
−i(k − 1)
+U ii (k)
Txii −W i(k)Tλi
+c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2
−c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥λi − λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
2
∥∥∥2} ∀i ∈ V. (19)
In the derivation of (19), we used (17) and (18). The next
min-max problem is equivalent in the sense that its solutions
for xii and λ
i are equivalent to the solutions of (19).
xii(k) = arg min
xii
max
λi
{
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k − 1)) + IΩi(xii)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2 + U ii (k)Txii (20)
+λi
T
(
Aiix
i
i +A
i
−ix
i
−i(k − 1)− bi −W i(k)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
)
− c|Ni|‖λi‖2
}
∀i ∈ V.
For the last two lines of (20), we complete the squared term
as follows:
xii(k) = arg min
xii
max
λi
{
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k − 1)) + IΩi(xii)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2 + U ii (k)Txii
−c|Ni|
∥∥∥λi − 1
2c|Ni|
[
c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
−W i(k) +Aiixii +Ai−ixi−i(k − 1)− bi
]∥∥∥2
+
1
4c|Ni|
∥∥∥c ∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
−W i(k) +Aiixii +Ai−ixi−i(k − 1)− bi
∥∥∥2}. (21)
Only the third line of (21) is dependent on λi which is the
maximization variable. Thus, to maximize (21) w.r.t. λi, we
let λi(k) be as follows:
λi(k) =
1
2c|Ni|
(
Aiix
i
i(k) +A
i
−ix
i
−i(k − 1)− bi
−W i(k) + 2c
∑
j∈Ni
λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
2
)
. (22)
Substituting back (22) into (21), we obtain,
xii(k) = arg min
xii
{
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k − 1)) + IΩi(xii)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2 + U ii (k)Txii
+
1
4c|Ni|
∥∥∥c ∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
−W i(k) +Aiixii +Ai−ixi−i(k − 1)− bi
∥∥∥2}. (23)
We simplify (23) by using a proximal first-order approxima-
tion for Ji(xii, x
i
−i(k − 1)) and the last term in (23) around
xi(k − 1); thus using inexact ADMM it follows:
xii(k) = arg min
xii
{[
∇iJi(xi(k − 1)) + A
i
i
T
2c|Ni|
(
Aixi(k − 1)
−bi −W i(k) + c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
)]T
.
.(xii − xii(k − 1)) +
βi
2
‖xii − xii(k − 1)‖2 + IΩi(xii)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2 + U ii (k)Txii}, (24)
where βi > 0 is a penalty factor for the proximal first-order
approximation for i ∈ V . We obtain an equivalent problem
to (24) in the following such that its gradient w.r.t. xii is
equivalent to that of (24).
xii(k) = arg min
xii
{
IΩi(xii) +
αi
2
∥∥∥xii − α−1i (βixii(k − 1)
−∇iJi(xi(k − 1))− U ii (k) + c
∑
j∈Ni
(xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1))
− A
i
i
T
2c|Ni|
(
Aixi(k − 1)− bi −W i(k)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
))∥∥∥2}, (25)
where αi := βi+2c|Ni|. Let proxag [s] := arg minx{g(x)+
a
2‖x − s‖2} be the proximal operator for the non-smooth
function g. Note that proxαiIΩi [s] = TΩi [s] where TΩi : R→
Ωi is an Euclidean projection. Then for each player i, ∀i ∈ V
we obtain,
xii(k) = TΩi
[
α−1i
(
γix
i
i(k − 1)−∇iJi(xi(k − 1))− U ii (k)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
xji (k − 1)−
Aii
T
2c|Ni|
(
Ai−ix
i
−i(k − 1)− bi −W i(k)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
))]
, (26)
where γi := βi + c|Ni| − 12c|Ni|Aii
T
Aii.
Eventually, after updating his action and dual Lagrange
multiplier, each player i takes average of the received infor-
mation with his estimate and updates his estimate as follows:
xi−i(k)=
1
2
(
xi−i(k−1)+
1
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
xj−i(k−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RECEIVED INFORMATION
)
− 1
2c|Ni|U
i
−i(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PENALTY TERM
,
(27)
where c > 0 is a scalar coefficient which is also used in (11).
Note that in (27), the penalty term is associated with the
difference between the estimates of the neighboring players
(Equations (12), (13)).
Then the ADMM algorithm is represented as in Algo-
rithm 1.
IV. CONVERGENCE PROOF
Theorem 1. Let βi > 0 be player i’s penalty factor of
the approximation in the inexact ADMM Algorithm 1 which
satisfies
σF >
1
2βi − ‖A
i
i‖2
c|Ni|
, (28)
where σF is a positive constant for the cocoercive property
of F , Aii is player i’s problem data and Ni is the number of
neighbors of player i. Under Assumptions 1-4, the sequence
{xi(k)} ∀i ∈ V , generated by Algorithm 1 converges to x∗
NE of game (2).
Proof . From step 7 in Algorithm 1, we obtain the follow-
ing optimality condition:
∇iJi(xi(k − 1)) + βi(xii(k)− xii(k − 1)) + ∂iIΩi(xii(k))
+
Aii
T
2c|Ni|
(
Aixi(k − 1)− bi −W i(k) (29)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k − 1) + λj(k − 1))
)
+ U ii (k)
Algorithm 1 ADMM Algorithm
1: initialization xi(0) ∈ Ω, λi(0) ∈ Rm, U i(0) = 0N and
W i(0) = 0m ∀i ∈ V
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
3: for each player i ∈ V do
4: players i, j ∀j ∈ Ni exchange xi(k − 1),
xj(k − 1), λi(k − 1) and λj(k − 1).
5: U i(k)=U i(k−1)+c∑j∈Ni(xi(k−1)−xj(k−1))
6: W i(k)=W i(k−1)+c∑j∈Ni(λi(k−1)−λj(k−1))
7: xii(k) = TΩi
[
α−1i
(
γix
i
i(k−1)−∇iJi(xi(k−1))
−U ii (k) + c
∑
j∈Ni x
j
i (k − 1)
− Aii
T
2c|Ni|
(
Ai−ix
i
−i(k − 1)− bi −W i(k)
+c
∑
j∈Ni λ
i(k − 1) + λj(k − 1)
))]
8: λi(k) = 12c|Ni|
(
Aiix
i
i(k) +A
i
−ix
i
−i(k − 1)− bi
−W i(k) + 2c∑j∈Ni λi(k−1)+λj(k−1)2 )
9: xi−i(k) =
∑
j∈Ni x
j
−i(k−1))
|Ni| −
Ui−i(k−1)
2c|Ni|
10: end for
11: end for
+2c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xii(k)−
xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)
2
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ V,
Adding and subtracting Aiix
i
i(k) from the second line of (29)
and using (22), it leads to
∇iJi(xi(k − 1)) + ∂iIΩi(xii(k)) +Aii
T
λi(k)
+δi(x
i
i(k)− xii(k − 1)) + U ii (k) (30)
+2c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xii(k)−
xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)
2
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ V,
where δi := βi − 12c|Ni|Aii
T
Aii. Adding the first Nash
condition (9) and multiplying by (xii(k)− x∗i ), we obtain,(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k − 1)− x∗i )
+
(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k)− xii(k − 1))
+
(
∂iIΩi(xii(k))− ∂iIΩi(x∗i )
)T
(xii(k)− x∗i )
+
(
λi(k)− λ∗
)T
Aii(x
i
i(k)− x∗i ) (31)
+δi(x
i
i(k)− xii(k − 1))T (xii(k)− x∗i )
+
(
U ii (k)− U ii
∗)T
(xii(k)− x∗i )
+2c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xii(k)−
xii(k − 1)+xji (k − 1)
2
)T
(xii(k)−x∗i )=0
On the other hand, from (22) we obtain,
0m = −Aiixii(k)−Ai−ixi−i(k − 1) + bi
+W i(k) + 2c
∑
j∈Ni
λi(k)− λ
i(k) + λj(k)
2
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k) + λj(k)− λi(k − 1)− λj(k − 1)),(32)
Note that by (14) and (15), W i(k + 1) = W i(k) +
2c
∑
j∈Ni λ
i(k) − λi(k)+λj(k)2 . Then, We add the second
Nash condition (9) to (32). Moreover, using Assumption 1,
there exists a matrix Bi such that we multiply into (32) and
then multiply the result by (λi(k)− λ∗).
0 = −(xii(k)− x∗i )TAii
T
(λi(k)− λ∗)
+
(
W i(k + 1)−W i∗
)T
Bi
T
(λi(k)− λ∗)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k) + λj(k)− λi(k − 1)− λj(k − 1))T
.Bi
T
(λi(k)− λ∗). (33)
Adding (33) to (31), it yields,(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k − 1)− x∗i )
+
(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k)− xii(k − 1))
+
(
∂iIΩi(xii(k))− ∂iIΩi(x∗i )
)T
(xii(k)− x∗i )
+δi(x
i
i(k)− xii(k − 1))T (xii(k)− x∗i )
+
(
U ii (k)− U ii
∗)T
(xii(k)− x∗i )
+
(
W i(k + 1)−W i∗)TBiT (λi(k)− λ∗)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k) + λj(k)− λi(k − 1)− λj(k − 1))T .
.Bi
T
(λi(k)− λ∗) (34)
+2c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xii(k)−
xii(k − 1)+xji (k − 1)
2
)T
(xii(k)−x∗i ) = 0.
The last equation that we need to add it to (34) is the one
associated with xi−i, (27), and multiplied by (x
i
−i − x∗−i).
U i−i(k)
T (xi−i(k)− x∗−i)
+2c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xi−i(k)−
xi−i(k − 1) + xj−i(k − 1)
2
)T
.(xi−i(k)− x∗−i) = 0. (35)
Adding (35) to (34), and using (12) and (13) for simplifica-
tion, we obtain,(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k − 1)− x∗i )
+
(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k)− xii(k − 1))
+
(
∂iIΩi(xii(k))− ∂iIΩi(x∗i )
)T
(xii(k)− x∗i )
+δi(x
i
i(k)− xii(k − 1))T (xii(k)− x∗i )
+
∑
j∈Ni
(uiji (k + 1)+v
ji
i (k + 1)−uiji
∗−vjii
∗
)T(xii(k)−x∗i )
+
∑
j∈Ni
(uij−i(k + 1) + v
ji
−i(k + 1))
T (xi−i(k)− x∗−i)
+
∑
j∈Ni
(wij(k + 1) + zji(k + 1)− wij∗ − zji∗)T
.Bi
T
(λi(k)− λ∗)
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(λi(k) + λj(k)− λi(k − 1)− λj(k − 1))T
.Bi
T
(λi(k)− λ∗).
+c
∑
j∈Ni
(
xi(k) + xj(k)− xi(k − 1)− xj(k − 1)
)T
.(xii(k)− x∗i ) = 0. (36)
The second and third terms are bounded as follows:(
∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)
)T
(xii(k)−xii(k − 1)) ≥ (37)
−1
2ρ
‖∇iJi(xi(k − 1))−∇iJi(x∗)‖2− ρ
2
‖xii(k)−xii(k − 1)‖2,
for any ρ > 0 ∀i ∈ V . By the convexity of IΩi (Assump-
tion 3), we have for the third term,
(∂IΩi(xii(k))− ∂IΩi(x∗i ))T (xii(k)− x∗i ) ≥ 0. (38)
Using (37) and (38) in (36) and summing over i ∈ V , we
obtain,(
F (x(k − 1))− F (x∗)
)T
(x(k − 1)− x∗)
− 1
2ρ
‖F (x(k − 1))− F (x∗)‖2 − 1
2
‖x(k)− x(k − 1)‖2M1
+(x(k)− x(k − 1))T diag((δieieTi )i∈V )(x(k)− x∗)
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uiji (k + 1)+v
ji
i (k + 1)−uiji
∗−vjii
∗
)T(xii(k)−x∗i)
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uij−i(k + 1) + v
ji
−i(k + 1))
T (xi−i(k)− x∗−i)
+
2
c
(w(k + 1)− w∗)T diag((BiT )i∈V )(w(k + 1)− w(k))
+c(λ(k)− λ(k − 1))T ((D +H)⊗ Im)
.diag((Bi
T
)i∈V )(λ(k)− λ∗) + c(x(k)− x(k − 1))T
.((D +H)⊗ IN )(x(k)− x∗) ≤ 0, (39)
where M1 := diag((ρeieTi )i∈V ), x
∗ = [x1∗
T
, . . . , xN
∗T
]T ,
λ = [λ1
T
, . . . , λN
T
]T and λ∗ = [λ1∗
T
, . . . , λN
∗T
]T . More-
over, w = (wi)i∈V ∈ Rm
∑
i∈V |Ni| and wi = (wij)j∈Ni ∈
Rm|Ni| and also w∗ = (wi∗)i∈V ∈ Rm
∑
i∈V |Ni| and
wi
∗
= (wiji
∗
)j∈Ni ∈ Rm|Ni|.
We bound the first term using Assumption 4,(
F (x(k − 1))− F (x∗)
)T
(x(k − 1)− x∗)
≥ σF ‖F (x(k − 1))− F (x∗)‖2. (40)
We also simplify the fourth and the fifth lines in
(39). Since GC is an undirected graph, for any {aij},∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni aij =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni aji. Then,∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uiji (k + 1)+v
ji
i (k + 1)−uiji
∗−vjii
∗
)T(xii(k)−x∗i )
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uij−i(k + 1) + v
ji
−i(k + 1))
T (xi−i(k)− x∗−i)
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uiji (k + 1)− uiji
∗
)T (xii(k)− x∗i )
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(viji (k + 1)− viji
∗
)T (xji (k)− x∗i )
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
uij−i(k + 1)
T (xi−i(k)− x∗−i)
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
vij−i(k + 1)
T (xj−i(k)− x∗−i). (41)
Note that by (12) and (13) as well as the initial conditions for
Lagrange multipliers uij(0) = vij(0) = 0N ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni,
we obtain,
uij(k) + vij(k) = 0N ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni, k > 0. (42)
Substituting (42) into (41) and using (9), we obtain,∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uiji (k + 1)− uiji
∗
)T (xii(k)− xji (k))
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
uij−i(k + 1)
T (xi−i(k)− xj−i(k))
=
2
c
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(uij(k + 1)− uiji
∗
ei)
T (uij(k + 1)− uij(k))
:=
2
c
(u(k + 1)− u∗)T (u(k + 1)− u(k)), (43)
where u = (ui)i∈V ∈ RN
∑
i∈V |Ni| and ui = (uij)j∈Ni ∈
RN |Ni| and also u∗ = (ui∗)i∈V ∈ RN
∑
i∈V |Ni| and ui∗ =
(uiji
∗
)j∈Ni ⊗ei ∈ RN |Ni|. Using (40) and (43), for ρ = 12σF
(39) becomes,
−1
2
‖x(k)− x(k − 1)‖2M1
+(x(k)− x(k − 1))TM2(x(k)− x∗)
+(λ(k)− λ(k − 1))TQ(λ(k)− λ∗)
+
2
c
(u(k + 1)− u∗)T (u(k + 1)− u(k))
+
2
c
(w(k + 1)− w∗)TB(w(k + 1)− w(k)) ≤ 0, (44)
where M2 := diag
(
(δieie
T
i )i∈V
)
+ c((D+H)⊗ IN ), B :=
diag((BiT )i∈V ) and Q := c((D +H)⊗ IN )B. Note that,
c((D +A)⊗ IN ) = c((D 12 (2I − LN )D 12 )⊗ IN ), (45)
where L := D −H , D 12 , D− 12 and LN := D− 12LD− 12 are
the Laplacian of GC , the square root and reciprocal square
root of D and the normalized Laplacian of GC , respectively.
Since D  0, D− 12 exist, it is shown in that λmax(LN ) ≤ 2.
Then (45) yields that c((D+H)⊗ IN )  0. This concludes
M2  0. Moreover, by Assumption 1, B  0. We use the
following inequality in (44) for every {a(k)} and M  0:
(a(k)− a(k − 1))TM(a(k)− a∗) = 1
2
‖a(k)− a∗‖2M
+
1
2
‖a(k)− a(k − 1)‖2M −
1
2
‖a(k − 1)− a∗‖2M . (46)
Then (44) becomes,{1
2
‖x(k)− x∗‖2M2 +
1
2
‖λ(k)− λ∗‖2Q
+
1
c
‖u(k + 1)− u∗‖2 + 1
c
‖w(k + 1)− w∗‖2B
}
≤{1
2
‖x(k − 1)− x∗‖2M2 +
1
2
‖λ(k − 1)− λ∗‖2Q
+
1
c
‖u(k)− u∗‖2 + 1
c
‖w(k)− w∗‖2B
}
−1
2
‖x(k)− x(k − 1)‖2M2−M1 −
1
2
‖λ(k)− λ(k − 1)‖2Q
−1
c
‖u(k + 1)− u(k)‖2 − 1
c
‖w(k + 1)− w(k)‖2B . (47)
By the condition (28), M2−M1  0. Then (47) implies the
following two results:
1) 12‖x(k) − x∗‖2M2 + 12‖λ(k) − λ∗‖2Q + 1c‖u(k + 1) −
u∗‖2 + 1c‖w(k + 1)− w∗‖2B → θ, for some θ ≥ 0,
2)

x(k)− x(k − 1)→ 0N2
λ(k)− λ(k − 1)→ 0mN
u(k + 1)− u(k)→ 0N∑i∈V |Ni|
w(k + 1)− w(k)→ 0m∑i∈V |Ni|
.
Result 1 implies that the sequences
{xi(k)}, {λi(k)}, {uij(k)} and {wij(k)} (similarly
{vij(k)} and {zij(k)}) are bounded and have limit points
denoted by x¯i, λ¯i, u¯ij and w¯ij (v¯ij and z¯ij), respectively.
Then, we obtain,
θ =
1
2
‖x¯(k)− x∗‖2M2 +
1
2
‖λ¯(k)− λ∗‖2Q
+
1
c
‖u¯(k + 1)− u∗‖2 + 1
c
‖w¯(k + 1)− w¯∗‖2B (48)
Result 2 along with (12) and (14) yield ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni,
x¯i = x¯j := x¯, λ¯i = λ¯j := λ¯ (49)
Moreover, by (42) we arrive at,
u¯ij + v¯ij = 0N ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni. (50)
Similarly, w¯ij + z¯ij = 0m ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni. Result 2 also
implies that by (49), (30) and (32):
∇iJi(x¯) + ∂IΩi(x¯i) +
∑
j∈Ni
(u¯iji + v˜
ji
i ) = 0, (51)
Aix¯− bi −
∑
j∈Ni
w¯ij + z¯ji = 0m. (52)
Comparing (49)-(52) with (9), it follows ∀i ∈ V, j ∈ Ni,
x¯i = x∗ (x¯ = x∗), λ¯i = x∗ (λ¯ = λ∗), (53)
u¯ij = uij
∗
(u¯ = u∗), w¯ij = wij
∗
(w¯ = w∗). (54)
This completes the proof. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate our algorithm for a wireless
ad-hoc network (WANET). Consider a WANET with 16
nodes and 16 multi-hop communication links as in Fig. 1 (a).
There are 15 users who aim to transfer data from a source to
a destination. Solid line represents a link Lj , j ∈ {1, . . . , 16}
and dashed line displays a path Ri, i ∈ {1, . . . , 15} that is
assigned to user i to transfer data. Each link Lj has a positive
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Fig. 1: (a) Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (left). (b) Communi-
cation graph GC (right).
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Fig. 2: Flow rates of users 1, 3, 5, 15. GNE points are
represented by black stars.
capacity Cj > 0 that restricts the users’ data flow . The data
flow of user i is denoted by xi such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 10. For
each user i, a cost function Ji is defined as in [7]:
Ji(xi, x−i) :=
∑
j:Lj∈Ri
κ
Cj −
∑
w:Lj∈Rw xw
−χi log(xi+1),
where κ > 0 and χi > 0 are network-wide known and user-
specific parameters, respectively.
The problem is to find a GNE of the game which is played
over a communication graph GC (depicted in Fig. 1 (b)). We
assume a common constraint x1 +x3 +x5 = 14 between the
players. It is straightforward to check the Assumptions 2,3
and 4 on GC and the cost functions. The users’ flow rate and
the dual Lagrange multipliers (they converge to 0) as well
as the normalized error are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for
χi = 15 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 15} and Cj = 15 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 16}.
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Fig. 3: Dual Lagrange multipliers for users 1, 3, 5, 15.
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Fig. 4: Normalized error of the users’ data flow.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A distributed GNE seeking algorithm is designed within
the framework of inexact-ADMM. Each player is only aware
of his own cost function, problem data and action set of
all players. Each player exchanges the estimates of other
players’ actions along with the local copy of his Lagrange
multiplier with his communication neighbors. An inexact-
ADMM algorithm is then derived to find a GNE of the game.
Convergence of the algorithm is then provided under mild
conditions on cost functions.
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